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Robert L. Youngblood, II, Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellee, through his
legal counsel, submits this Brief in Response to the Brief of Auto-Owners
Insurance Company, Defendant-Petitioner-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).
STATEMENT OI: ISSUE PRESENTED FOR Rt

IEW

The only issue before this Court, pursuant to its Order dated June 16,
2005, is the following:
Whether equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of ai i
insurance policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is
misstated by a company agent prior to the insured's purchase of the
policy.1

1

Auto-Owners appears, in its Brief, to have gone far afield from the issue laid
out by this Court in its Order of June 16, 2005. Mr. Youngblood will
nonetheless seek to limit his Brief to that issue and will, accordingly, not utilize
this Court's resources in responding to factual and legal contentions set forth
in Auto-Owners' Brief that are extraneous to that issue.
Also, Mr. Youngblood's counsel apologizes to the Court for inadvertently
ignoring that part of the Court's said Order that suspended the operation of
Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and for causing a Rule
26(a) Stipulation for extension of time to be filed on August 29, 2005. This
Brief is being submitted within the time set by the Rules and as though that
Stipulation had not been executed and filed.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appropriate standard of review appears to be one purely of law, with
this Court according no deference to the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, which implicitly answered the above-quoted issue under review by
this Court in the affirmative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Given the sole issue the Court has asked the parties to address, the
"Statement of the Case" can be appropriately distilled to the following:
1.

On or about December 30,1997 Mr. Youngblood was a

pedestrian, walking across a parking lot toward a medical office, when he was
struck by an automobile driven by one Rachel Louise Cooksey ("the
tortfeasor"). R. 43; 50-51.
2.

The tortfeasor had $50,000 in available liability insurance. R. 45;

3.

Mr. Youngblood settled with the tortfeasor for her policy limits. R.

56.

45; 56.
4.

Mr. Youngblood has alleged that his damages, for injuries

sustained as results of the tortfeasor's vehicle's striking him, exceed the
$50,000 that was paid by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. R. 45; 56-57.
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I1

The subject Auto-Owners policy includes a limit of $300 ()()() in

u.i.m. coverage R. 45.
•:.

Mr. Youngblood was, at all times material hereto, the president

and sole owner of Youngblood Home Improvement, Inc., the first-named
insured urvJpr the subject Auto-Owners policy R 64; 77-94; 104.
7.

Prior to settling his claim against the tortfeasor for the $50,000

liability policy limits, Mr. Youngblood, through his counsel, communicated with
Auto Owner , leqardim.) his intent ID settle that i lairn for those limits nn tin
condition that that settlement would not jeopardize his entitlement to u.i.m.
benefits under the subject Auto-Owners policy. R. 64; 107.
M

Mr Voungblood relied, tirsl in purchasing the subject policy of

insurance, and second in settling his claim against the tortfeasor, on
representations of Auto-Owners' agents that the Auto-Owners policy provided
him, personally, u.i.ni coverage, fur riulu-pedestiian accidents ifirst generally,
and then for the subject accident in particular). R. 65-66; 76; 95-105.
9.

Mr. Youngblood was not informed that u.i.m. benefits would not be

available to him because this was a corporate policy trom whose u i ni
coverage he could not as an injured pedestrian personally benefit. R. 66; 107;
104-05.
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10.

Mr. Youngblood, in reliance on the said representations of Auto-

Owners' agents, did not read the policy language that provides u.i.m. coverage
to a pedestrian only if he is the first-named insured in the policy. R. 104-05.
11.

The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (Honorable

William B. Bohling) rejected Mr. Youngblood's contention that Auto-Owners
should, by virtue of its agent's statement that underinsured motorist benefits
would be available to Mr. Youngblood in the event of an auto-pedestrian
collision in which he was injured and Mr. Youngblood's reasonable reliance on
that statement, be equitably estopped to deny coverage to him and,
accordingly, granted Auto-Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment.
12.

A unanimous panel of the Utah Court of Appeals, determining that

Mr. Youngblood must be allowed to pursue his equitable estoppel claim,
reversed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment.
13.

This Court, by its Order of June 16, 2005, granted Auto-Owners'

Petition for Certiorari and framed the issue as quoted at page 1, above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based on sound legal principles and important public policy
considerations, equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of an
insurance policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is misstated by a
company agent prior to an insured's purchase of the policy.
4

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
AND ALLOW MR. YOUNGBLOOD TO PRESENT HIS CASE TO A JURY.
This case deals with the bedrock legal concept that insurance
companies, like other entities, should be held to honor the oral representations
of their agents on which people such as Mr. Youngblood reasonably rely. The
Court of Appeals decision is not contrary to any decision of this Court. None
of this Court's cases relied on by Auto-Owners for its contention that the Court
of Appeals decision is in conflict with this Court's decisional Jaw deals with
considerations of estoppel or with affirmative misrepresentations by insurance
company saiespeople. This Court's cases so cited by Auto-Owners «Jeal with
questions of whether ambiguities exist in insurance contracts and with parol
evidence considerations. Mr. Youngblood has never contended that the policy
language at issue is ambiguous. Nor has he for the purpose of contract
interpretation ever sought to inject parol evidence into this case. This Court
should affirm the Court of Appeals decision and thereby uphold the basic and
appropriate proposition that, in limited circumstances (see Court of Appeals
decision at fl 27), insurance companies may be estopped to deny the
affirmative representations of their agentsH

5

This Court has, in cases such as Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co..
227 P. 805, 8082 (Utah 1924) made clear the public policy of this State to hold
insurance companies to the promises of their agents.
This Court has, in a different legal context, explained that
'Public policy' is the label we attach to those shared expectations and
standards of conduct which have acquired both widespread and deeply
held allegiance among the citizenry generally.
Hansen v. America Online, Inc.. 2004 UT 62, fl 12.
This Court has stated, also in a different legal context:
[The] principle of law [that one induced to make a contract by false
representations can be relieved from the burden thereof by a court in
equity] has been usually recognized by all courts and textwriters, and we
do not feel disposed to depart from a rule founded, as it is. upon
ordinary common honesty.
Berkeley Bank for Co-ops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980)
(emphasis added).
There is, when those fundamental concepts are understood, nothing
remarkable or out of the ordinary about the Court of Appeals decision, one that
simply fosters honesty and fair dealing (things that surely have — in the words
of this Court in Hansen -- "acquired both widespread and deeply held

2

"The principle that no one shall be permitted to deny that he intended the
natural consequences of his acts when he has induced others to rely upon
them is as applicable to insurance companies as it is to individuals .... This
principle is one of sound morals ... and its enforcement tends to uphold good
faith and fair dealing." (Emphasis added.)
6

allegiance among the citizenry generally").
Auto-Owners appears to be suggesting that this Court should determine
that, as a matter of law, Mr. Youngblood's reliance on the agent's pre-policypurchase representations was unreasonable, given his failure to read the
subject policy language.3 This Court should, in this connection, consider the
observations of the Court of Appeals in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, 739
P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987), particularly the statements that "[reasonable
reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is
usually a question for the jury to determine" and "[gjenerally, a plaintiff may
justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact fsuch as the instant statements by
the Auto-Owners agent] without independent investigation" (emphasis added),
and
It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should make it
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered
something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived,
that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation.
Id. at 638-39.

3

It may be significant that, although the policy language in question, dealing
with coverage for pedestrians, is not, strictly speaking, ambiguous, it is, as the
Court of Appeals noted, in its decision at n. 4:
confusing and does not make clear that Youngblood would not be
covered in an accident because the Policy was purchased in the
company name rather than his own.
7

Also, and also contrary to Auto-Owners' contention, there is no conflict
between the Court of Appeals decision in this case and its decision in Perkins
v. Great West Life Assurance Company. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). As
explained in the Court of Appeals decision at ffij 12-14, the facts in Perkins are
decidedly different from the facts in this case. Most importantly, in Perkins,
there were no representations made by an insurance policy salesperson on
which the plaintiff relied. The only misrepresentations in Perkins were made
by the plaintiff's decedent. 814 P.2d at 1130. At the heart of the Court of
Appeals decision in this case is that an Auto-Owners agent made specific prepolicy purchase representations on which, as a matter of triable fact,
Mr. Youngblood reasonably relied in purchasing the subject policy.
The Court needs to consider the proposition, advanced by Auto-Owners
and apparently accepted by the District Court, that insurance companies can
never be estopped to deny coverage, regardless of statements of their agents,
simply because those statements are at odds with the contents of insurance
policies. Mr. Youngblood, a person who is not particularly sophisticated with
respect to the contents of insurance policies in general, or with respect to his
own policies in particular, is certainly not unique in his reliance on what his
insurance company representative told him.

8

If Auto-Owners is correct in its analysis and if the rule of Perkins is to be
applied as broadly as Auto-Owners has argued it should be, people even less
sophisticated than Mr. Youngblood, and even the mentally infirm, will be held
to have no estoppel remedy, even in cases of the most egregious
misrepresentations, if they, in reliance on pro-coverage misrepresentations by
sloppy or unscrupulous insurance company representatives, do not read the
language of their policies. Mr. Youngblood submits that that should not and
cannot be the law.
Nor should the fact that some jurisdictions reject the contention that
insurance companies may be estopped to deny the effect of oral
representations of their agents cause this Court to determine that that is a rule
of law that this Court should adopt. The better-reasoned decisions and those
more in tune with extant law of this Court and sound public policy agree with
the position espoused by Mr. Youngblood.
This Court would be hard-pressed to find, in any survey it might conduct
of the holdings and observations of courts of other jurisdictions, statements
better fitting the law and policy of this State than those of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Harr v. Allstate Insurance Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969),

9

discussed in the Court of Appeals decision at fl 18. The Harr court noted that
it was impressed by decisions4 that proceeded
on the thesis that where an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even
though innocently, the coverage of an insurance contract, or the
exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or at the inception of the
contract, and the insured reasonably relies thereupon to his ultimate
detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk
or from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy.
Id. at 219. The Harr court also stated that "the fabove statedl proposition is
one of elementary and simple justice" (emphasis added), and "by justifiably
relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the insured has been prevented
from procuring the desired coverage elsewhere," and "To reject this approach
because a new contract is thereby made for the parties would be an
unfortunate triumph of form over substance." Id. That the facts in Harr differ

4

Those decisions mentioned by the Harr court are the following: Golden Gate
Motor Transport Co. v. Great American Indemnity Co.. 6 Cal. 2d 439, 58 P.2d
374 (1936); Ivev v. United National Indemnity Company. 259 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.
1958) (applying California law); American Surety Co. of New York v. Heise.
136 Cal. App. 2d 689, 289 P.2d 103 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Beach v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. 205 Cal. App. 2d 409, 23 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Modica v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. 236 Cal.
App. 2d 588, 46 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co. v. Bailey. 55 Del. (5 Storey) 215, 190 A.2d 757 (1963); United
Pacific Insurance Co. v. Meyer. 305 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Idaho
law); Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thomas. 372 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.
1967) (applying South Carolina law); Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Bechard. 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W. 2d 86,1 A.L.R.3d 1124 (1963); State
Automobile Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen. 81 S.D. 472,136 N.W.2d
884 (1965); Dodge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. Vt., 250 A.2d 742 (1969).
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somewhat from the facts in this case should not, especially in light of the issue
as framed by this Court's Order of June 16, 2005, be viewed by this Court as
undercutting the significance of the Harr court's holding and eloquent
observations.
This Court should also consider the following passage from American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jefferv. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
There the federal district court, in the course of denying the insurance
company's motion for summary judgment in that coverage dispute, explained:
Indiana courts have recognized that an insurer may be equitably
estopped from denying coverage when the insurer's agent makes oral
misrepresentations regarding the coverage provided by the policy and
the purchaser reasonably relies on such misrepresentations. The
Indiana Court of Appeals discussed the application of equitable estoppel
under such circumstances in Village Furniture v. Associated InsManagers. Inc.. 541 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1989). In that case, an
insured furniture company brought an action to determine whether its
insurance policy provided coverage for losses due to a fire at its
furniture store. The insurer had denied coverage based on a "sprinkler
clause," which precluded coverage for fire damage when an insured had
turned off its sprinkler system. The insured's representatives admitted
that they had never read the insurance policy. They claimed, however,
that they had informed the insurer's agent about the company's previous
problems with the sprinkler system freezing during cold weather and that
the company was procuring insurance because of this problem. The
parties agreed that the agent had never mentioned the sprinkler cause
to the company representatives. Id. at 307.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the
insured had a duty to read the insurance policy and "to inform itself
about its contract of insurance." Id. at 308. The Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed. The court recognized that, although an insured
generally has a duty to read his insurance policy, an exception exists
11

when an insurance company has "led the insured to believe that the
specific coverage he had requested had been provided." Id. The court
then quoted a Seventh Circuit case with approval: It is true that courts
in Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not read their
insurance policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so
because the policies are unreadable, have held that the agent's oral
representations at the time of sale can override the written terms of the
policy. If the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy
will insure against a hazard ... that the prospect is particularly
concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the company may be
estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of the
agent's oral assurances lulled the prospect into not reading, or reading
inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language.
Id. Emphasis in original, quoting Burns v. Rockford Life Ins. Co.. 740
F.2d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). The Indiana
court then concluded that a question of fact remained as to whether the
insured reasonably relied on the insurance agent's representations.

In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to insurance coverage
disputes, Indiana courts recognize an exception to the longstanding
common law rule that a purchaser has a duty to read and understand
the terms of his insurance policy. See Anderson Mattress Co. v. First
State Ins.. 617 N.E.2d 932, 940 (Ind. App. 1993) (noting that, although
older cases imposed an 'almost unconditional duty on the purchaser of a
policy to acquaint himself with its contents and to understand them,'
more recent cases have 'recognized exceptions to the rule'); accord,
Plohg v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co.. 583 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. App.
1992) (The traditional rule has been that reliance is not justified where
the injured party has a written instrument available and fails or neglects
to read it. On the other hand, we have come to recognize that in the
modern world ordinary, i.e., reasonable, care does not necessarily
require a person to read something as complex as today's insurance
policies.') (internal citation omitted); Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Ins. Co..
555 N.E.2d 844, 849-50 (Ind. App. 1990) (noting that, although insured
generally has a duty to learn the terms of her insurance policy, there are
'certain exceptions to this duty' including 'reasonable reliance upon an
agent's representations').
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2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12556, *10-*14 (some emphasis added).
The analyses of the American Family case and the Indiana state court
cases discussed in American Family seem to fit the facts here better than does
the Court of Appeals' analysis in Perkins. And those cases seem to be
attuned, whereas the Perkins decision does not, to this Court's Ellerbeck
observation quoted hereinabove at n. 2 (p. 6). See, also, Scarborough v.
Dependable Ins. Co.. 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219, *2-*4; Kramer v. United
Services Auto Ass'n, 436 So.2d 935, 936-67 (Fla. App. 1983).
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Court should ask itself whether it is good public policy that an
insurance company be allowed to affirmatively misrepresent facts regarding
coverage with impunity and then do a "King's X" based on language in an
insurance policy that is unlikely that the average lay person would even read.
This Court's reinstating the District Court's ruling summarily dismissing
Mr. Youngblood's claim would work injustice not only to Mr. Youngblood but
also to other victims of overzealous, careless, and/or unscrupulous insurance
company salespeople and insurance company adjusters who fail to acquaint
themselves with and/or for other reasons fail accurately to represent the
particulars of their companies' policies' coverage provisions.

13

It should be, as the Court of Appeals decision recognized, for a jury to
determine, based on all the circumstances, whether Mr. Youngblood's reliance
on the representations of Auto-Owners' agent was reasonable. And this Court
should reject Auto-Owners' suggestion that the testimony of someone in
Mr. Youngblood's position is insufficient evidence to carry a case to a jury.
The law should not assume that someone in Mr. Youngblood's position would
commit perjury for potential monetary gain.
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, Mr. Youngblood urges
this Court to answer the question set forth in its June 16, 2005 Order in the
affirmative, to affirm the Court of Appeals decision, and to allow
Mr. Youngblood to present his case to a jury.
Respectfully submitted this

«=>

day of September, 2005.

PETER C. COLLINS
PETER C. COLLINS, L.L.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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